In th is paper I c l a r i f y the d is tin c tio n between actio ns p e r formed under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behavior through an examination o f two d is tin c tiv e fe atures o f a ctions performed under a s o c ia l r u le . Developing an argument p ro posed by H.L.A. H art in The Concept o f Law, I f i r s t argue th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , there nonconform ity/conform i t y to the p a tte rn o f behavior set down in the ru le count as good reasons fo r criticism /com m endation o f a ctions covered by the r u le . Secondly I argue th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity to the p a tte m set down in the r u le must be taken account o f (a t the r is k o f s e lf-c o n tr a d ic tio n ) in ju dg in g actio ns covered by the ru le commen dable or su b je ct to c r itic is m . This in tu rn means th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , there can be no genuine excep tio n s to the ru le because the n o tio n o f a genuine exception to a s o c ia l ru le makes no sense.
S o cia l Rules and P atterns o f Behavior
The question whether there is a s ig n ific a n t d is tin c tio n to be drawn between actions performed under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behavior is a question o f the h ig h e st importance f o r s o c ia l and p o l i t i c a l philosophy and fo r the philosophy o f the s o c ia l sciences. In th is paper I s h a ll argue in support o f th is d is tin c tio n by d e scrib in g two im portant c h a ra c te ris tic s o f s itu a tio n s governed by s o c ia l ru le s th a t are n o t c h a ra c te ris tic s o f a mere p a tte rn o f behavior. The f i r s t se ctio n is an examination and develop ment o f H.L.A. H a rt's argument in support o f th is d is tin c tio n in The Concept o f Law. In the second se ctio n I exam ine a second c h a r a c te r is tic o f actio ns performed under a s o c ia l ru le and o ffe r a th e s is regarding such a ctions th a t is considerably stronger than the th e s is which H art defends Section One: H a rt's Argument H.L.A. H art presents h is arguments supporting the d is t in c t io n between actio ns performed under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behavior o r, as he c a lls i t , "a h a b it, " as p a rt o f h is c r itiq u e o f John A u s tin 's theory o f la w .l There are, H art t e l l s us, "th re e s a lie n t d iffe re n c e s " be tween a ctio n s performed under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behavior. I s h a ll examine each o f H a rt's d i f f erences in tu rn .
The f i r s t d iffe re n c e which H art speaks o f concerns the occurrence, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , o f c r itic is m o f 1-Hart uses the term " h a b it" in h is treatm ent o f th is ques tio n because i t is the term which A u stin used. For our present purposes, however, the term " h a b it" is not a happy one. As H art h im s e lf notes, the term " h a b it" does n ot apply co nve nien tly to the a ctio n s o f groups o f persons. "H a b it" also has im portant p sych o lo g ica l connotations which are o f no s ig n ific a n c e to the m atter a t hand. On these p o in ts , see H.L.A. H a rt, The Concept o f Law (Oxford, C la r endon Press, 1961) , pp. 5 l, 56, 85f. For these reasons I s h a ll employ the more n e u tra l expression, "p a tte rn o f be h a v io r ," in th is paper. behavior which does not conform to the ru le and o f pressure fo r actio ns which do conform. Hart w rite s : " F ir s t , fo r the group to have a h a b it i t is enough th a t th e ir behavior in fa c t converges. . . But such general convergence or even id e n tity o f behavior is not enough to c o n s titu te the e x is tence o f a ru le re q u irin g th a t behavior: where there is such a ru le d e via tio n s are g e n e ra lly regarded as lapses o r fa u lts open to c r itic is m , and threatened d e via tio n s meet w ith pressure f o r c o n fo rm ity, though the forms o f c r i t i cism and pressure d i f f e r w ith d iffe r e n t types o f r u le . " (p.54)2 H a rt's p o in t is th a t, i f nonconforming acts d id n o t meet w ith c r itic is m , then we would not say th a t there was a s o c ia l ru le in existence in th a t s itu a tio n . H art is s u re ly r ig h t in t h is ; but two fu rth e r comments need to be added. F ir s t , H a rt's argument does not support the claim th a t such c r it ic is m and pressure are d is tin c tiv e o f s o c ia l ru le s , but o n ly th a t they are a necessary c o n d itio n fo r the e x is tence o f a s o c ia l r u le . Indeed i t is q u ite p o ssib le fo r there to be a p a tte rn o f behavior which does n o t in v o lve a s o c ia l r u le , but which is accompanied by c r itic is m o f nonconforming behavior and pressure to conform. Let us take H a rt's own example o f a mere p a tte rn o f behavior: a c e rta in group o f people re g u la rly go to the movies on Saturday n ig h ts (p .5 4 ). Suppose th a t some members o f the group choose to stay home on a c e rta in Saturday to s i t on t h e ir porches and watch the sun set in ste ad o f going to the movies. They m ight w e ll receive c r itic is m from o th e r mem bers o f the group (or from o th e r persons who had sim ply observed t h e ir re g u la r p a tte rn o f going to the m ovies)--fo r being in c o n s is te n t, perhaps, or fo r being u n s o c ia l, or fo r sim ply m issing a good movie o r a pleasant evening w ith the group. The mere fa c t th a t c r itic is m and pressure occur is not a s u f f ic ie n t reason fo r us to conclude th a t a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts . I t is not a d is tin c tiv e fe a tu re o f s o c ia l r u le s .
Secondly, by focusing e x c lu s iv e ly on c r itic is m o f nonconforming a ctio n s and pressure to conform, H art passes over o th e r im portant types o f behavior th a t are ch a ra cte r i s t i c o f s itu a tio n s in which there are s o c ia l ru le s . He passes over, fo r example, the commendation o f conforming behavior, e s p e c ia lly in those who are ju s t le a rn in g , and also acts o f s e lf -c r it ic is m and self-commendation. A l l o f these are c h a r a c te r is tic fe atures o f s itu a tio n s in whicĥ Unless otherw ise in d ic a te d , a l l page references are to H.L.A. H a rt, The Concept o f Law.
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D-12 th ere are s o c ia l ru le s . As I have sa id, however, none o f these b e h a v io rs --n o r the set o f a l l o f them to g e th e r--c o n s titu t e s a d is tin c tiv e fe a tu re o f a s itu a tio n in which there are s o c ia l ru le s . They can be found as p a rts o f mere p a tte rn s o f behavior as w e ll. Henceforth in th is paper I s h a ll employ the r u b ric " c r it ic is m and commendation" to in d ic a te the whole range o f these b e h a v io rs , both p o s itiv e and n eg ative , th a t I have spoken o f here.
H a rt's f i r s t d iffe re n c e does not provide us w ith a d is tin g u is h in g fe a tu re o f a ctio n s performed under a s o c ia l r u le . But h is second " s a lie n t d iffe re n c e " is ju s t what he says i t i s . He argues th a t actio ns performed under a soc i a l ru le d i f f e r from a mere p a tte rn o f behavior in th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , nonconform ity counts in and o f i t s e l f as a good reason fo r c r itic is m and co nfo rm ity cotints in and o f i t s e l f as a good reason fo r commendation. He w rite s : "Secondly, where there are such ru le s , not only is such c r itic is m in fa c t made, but d e v ia tio n from the stan dard is g e n e ra lly accepted as a good reason fo r making i t . " (p.54, emphasis added)
The d is tin c tio n does not l i e in the fa c t th a t c r itic is m and commendation occur, as we have seen. I t lie s ra th e r in the c h a r a c te r is tic ju s t if ic a t io n o r le g itim a tio n o f c r itic is m and commendation where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts . For where no s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , the mere fa c t o f nonconfo rm ity /c o n fo rm ity is in s u f f ic ie n t to j u s t i f y c r it ic is m / commendation. But where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , nonconformity /c o n fo rm ity are s u ffic ie n t in and o f themselves, i . e . , count as good reasons, in the ju s t if ic a t io n o f c r it ic is m / commendation. H art does not expand on th is ; but i t w i l l be h e lp fu l to look a t some examples to make h is p o in t c le a r.
Using H a rt's example o f a s o c ia l ru le (p .5 4 ), l e t us suppose th a t a ru le e x is ts in a p a r tic u la r community to the e ffe c t th a t the male head is to be bared upon one' s e n te rin g a church. I f Jones enters a church w ith o u t b a r ing h is head, the mere fa c t th a t he has fa ile d to conform to the p a tte rn set down in the ru le is s u ffic ie n t reason fo r c r i t i c i s i n g h is a c tio n . No o th e r premises are needed fo r the c r it ic is m to be reasonable. I t can be com pletely explained by saying: "That is the r u le ; th a t is what we do h e re ." S im ila r ly i f Smith takes h is son to church and the boy remembers to remove h is hat upon e n te rin g , i t is f u l l y reasonable fo r Smith to commend him fo r the a c tio n . I t is reasonable because there is a ru le and the boy's a c tio n was in co nfo rm ity w ith the p a tte rn set down in i t .
No o th e r in fo rm a tio n is needed fo r us to know th a t Sm ith's
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commendation o f h is son was ju s t if ie d .
On the o th e r hand, i f we suppose th a t Smith chooses not to go to the movies on Saturday n ig h t, though he is one o f a group o f people who re g u la rly go on Saturday n ig h ts , then i f Jones c r it ic is e s him and Smith asks Jones why, i t is n ot s u f f ic ie n t fo r Jones to respond sim ply th a t "everyone in the group always goes." For th is response to c o n s titu te a good reason, Jones must be suppressing some a d d itio n a l p re mise. He may be ta k in g i t fo r granted, fo r example, th a t i t is very s a tis fy in g to do what everyone in the group re g u la r ly does o r he may b e lie v e th a t, when everyone in the group judges some a c t iv it y enjoyable and w orth doing, then th a t is c e rta in ly the best th in g one can do. W ith some such premise behind h is answer, Jones's response would at le a s t make sense. ( I t would also be necessary, o f course, fo r Jones's premises to be tru e . But our concern here is w ith what kinds o f reasons make sense, i . e . , count as good reasons.) W ithout a s o c ia l ru le to appeal to , Jones's e f f o r t to j u s t i f y h is c r itic is m o f Smith sim ply on the basis o f the l a t t e r 's f a ilu r e to fo llo w the p a tte rn does not make sense. N onconform ity/conform ity do not count in and o f themselves as good reasons fo r criticism /com m endation unless a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts . Here we have a c le a r and im portant d iffe re n c e between a ctio n s performed under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f b e h a v io r.3
In a fo o tn o te a t th is p o in t H art re fe rs the reader to Winch, The Idea o f a. S o cia l Science (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958X7 pp~ 57-65 and 84-94, and to P idd in gton , "M a lin o w ski's Theory o f Needs" in F ir t h , Man and C ulture (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957) . Both o f these authors stre ss the importance o f c r itic is m when a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts and p o in t to the p o s s ib ilit y o f making a m is take. But n e ith e r p o in ts e x p li c it l y , as H art does, to the s p e c ia l k in d o f good reasons fo r c r itic is m (and commenda tio n ) th a t is a v a ila b le when a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts . Max B la c k 's e x c e lle n t study, "The A nalysis o f R ules," in Models and Metaphors (Ith a c a , New York, C o rn e ll U n iv e rs ity Press, 1 9 6 2 o ffe rs an im portant a na lysis o f the "re g u la tio n sense" o f r u le , a category which c lo s e ly p a r a lle ls the c a t egory o f " s o c ia l r u le " being examined in th is paper. But when Black seeks the d is tin c tiv e c h a ra c te ris tic s o f th is type o f r u le , h is a tte n tio n too is focused on the element o f pressure fo r co nfo rm ity and on the p o s s ib ilit y o f mak ing a m istake. The treatm ent o f th is question which most c lo s e ly p a r a lle ls H art in focusing on what count as good H a rt' s t h ir d d iffe re n c e is concerned w ith what he c a lls the " in te r n a l aspect" o f a s o c ia l ru le : " In order th a t there should be. . .a h a b it, no member o f the group need in any way th in k o f the general behavior, or even know th a t the behavior in question is general. . . By c o n tra s t, i f a s o c ia l ru le is to e x is t some a t le a s t must look upon the behavior in question as a general standard to be fo llo w ed by the group as a whole. A s o c ia l ru le has an 'in te r n a l aspect' in a d d itio n to the e x te rn a l aspect th a t i t shares w ith a s o c ia l h a b it and which co nsists in the re g u la r u n i form behavior which an observer could re c o rd ." (p.55) An il lu s t r a t io n o f th is " in te r n a l aspect" is given by H art in th is passage about a chess p la y e r: "Each (p la y e r) n o t o n ly moves the Queen in a c e rta in way h im s e lf, but 'has view s' about the p ro p rie ty o f a l l moving o f the Queen in th a t way . . . (views which are) m anifested in the c r itic is m o f others and demands fo r co nfo rm ity. . .and in acknowledgement o f the le g itim a c y o f such c r itic is m s and demands when received from o th e rs ." (p.56)
Since H art speaks o f th is aspect o f a s o c ia l ru le as something " in te r n a l" and co n tra sts i t w ith "behavior which an observor could re c o rd ," i t
m ight seem th a t h is p o in t concerns c h a r a c te r is tic fe e lin g s which are had by those who perform a ctions under a s o c ia l ru le . But Hart makes i t c le a r th a t th is is not what he has in mind:
The in te r n a l aspect o f ru le s is o fte n m is in te rp re te d as a mere m atter o f " fe e lin g s " in c o n tra s t w ith e x te r n a lly observable p h y s ic a l behavior. Mo doubt where reasons fo r c r itic is m and commendation when a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts is to be found in John Rawls, "Two Concepts o f R u le s," The P h ilo s o p h ic a l Review, LXIV (1955), pp. 3-32. Rawls' p o s itio n is in agreement w ith H a rt's p o s itio n as I have described i t and Rawls o ffe rs arguments very s im i la r to H a rt's in supporting th is much o f h is own p o s i tio n . But Rawls goes w e ll beyond H a rt, arguing th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , there only nonconform ity/confo rm ity to the p a tte rn set down in the r u le , and nothing e lse , can count as good reasons fo r criticism/com menda tio n . On th is p o in t see fo o tn o te 9 below. A valuable examination o f both H a rt's and Rawls' analyses o f s o c ia l ru le s is Thomas Morawetz, "The Concept o f a P ra c tic e ," P h ilo s o p h ic a l S tu d ie s, XXIV (1973), pp. 209-226. Morawetz examines the d iffe re n c e s between games lik e chess and b a se b a ll, which both authors employ as examples o f systems o f s o c ia l ru le s , and such systems o f s o c ia l ru le s as le g a l systems and languages. ru le s are g e n e ra lly accepted by a s o c ia l group and gen e r a lly supported by s o c ia l c r itic is m and pressure fo r c o n fo rm ity, in d iv id u a ls may o fte n have p sycho lo gical experiences analogous to those o f r e s t r ic t io n or com p u ls io n . When they say they " fe e l bound" to behave in c e rta in ways they may indeed r e fe r to these experiences. But such fe e lin g s are n e ith e r necessary nor s u f f ic ie n t fo r the existence o f "b in d in g " ru le s . There is no con tr a d ic tio n in saying th a t people accept c e rta in ru le s but experience no such fe e lin g s o f compulsion, (p.56) I f the " in te r n a l aspect" does not r e fe r to persons' f e e l ings , then what does Hart have in mind? In h is f i n a l com ment on the t h ir d d iffe re n c e , H art says: "What is necessary is th a t there should be a c r i t i c a l r e fle c t iv e a ttitu d e to c e rta in p a tte rn s o f behavior as a common standard, and th a t th is should d is p la y i t s e l f in c r itic is m (in c lu d in g s e lfc r itic is m ) , demands fo r co nfo rm ity and in acknowledgements th a t such c r itic is m and demands are j u s t i f i e d . " (p .5 6 )Ŵ hat H art is doing h e re , I b e lie v e , is e la b o ra tin g on what i t means to say th a t something counts as a good reason w ith in a p a r tic u la r community o f reasoners. He wants to make i t c le a r th a t, fo r something to count as a good reason w ith in a p a r tic u la r group, i t must fu n c tio n as such in the a ctu a l reasoning o f the members o f the group. For us to say th a t n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity to the p a tte rn set down in a s o c ia l ru le count as good reasons fo r criticism /com m endation, i t must be the case th a t the members o f the group concerned a c tu a lly do j u s t i f y criticism /com m endation in terms o f non c o n fo rm ity / co nfo rm ity and th a t they accept such j u s t i f i c a tio n s as adequate when they are a pp lie d to them selves.5
Hart notes here, as he does not elsewhere, th a t the p a t te rn o f c r it ic is m associated w ith a s o c ia l ru le includes s e lf -c r it ic is m . S im ila rly the p a tte rn o f commendation asso c ia te d w ith a s o c ia l r u le , which H art does not mention ex p l i c i t l y anywhere, includes self-com m endation.
As H art p o in ts out (p .5 5 ), however, i t is not p o ssib le to s p e c ify ahead o f time o r in the form o f a general ru le ju s t how many members o f the group must act in these ways or how o fte n o r how long they must do so fo r us to be able to say th a t the group acts in th is way. But we do not need to be able to s p e c ify such th in gs fo r us to be able to say th a t, fo r something to count as a good reason, the members o f the group must employ i t as such in th e ir reasonings. The ambi g u ity here is the am biguity o f the n o tio n o f a p a tte rn o f a c t iv it y on the p a rt o f a group (namely, in th is case, tïïe a c t iv it y o f counting som ethingas a good rea son ), n o t an am biguity o f the concept o f s o c ia l ru le .
I f th is^in te r p r e ta tio n is c o rre c t, then H a rt's t h ir d p o in t does not give us an a d d itio n a l d iffe re n c e between a ctions performed under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behav io r , In fa c t H art h im s e lf says: "The t h ir d fe a tu re . . .is im p lic it in what has already been s a id " (p .5 5 ). But th is e la b o ra tio n on the second p o in t is s t i l l very im po rtan t. For the th ru s t o f H a rt's comments on the " in te r n a l aspect" o f s o c ia l ru le s is th a t we cannot speak about nonconform ity/ co nfo rm ity counting as good reasons w ith o u t im plying some th in g about the judgments and o th e r a ctions o f those who so count them.°H ?Hart also attempts to describe the in te rn a l aspect nega t i v e ly by e x p la in in g the lim it s o f the "e x te rn a l a s p e c t," th a t is , o f what is a v a ila b le , as he puts i t in another sec tio n (p p .79-88), from the "e x te rn a l p o in t o f v ie w ." But h is term inology in these sections is confusing. I t seems th a t we must take "e x te rn a l" to mean "o u ts id e the group o f those who count n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity as good reasons fo r criticism /com m endation (concerning some s p e c ific form o f b e h a v io r)." Thus " in te r n a l" would r e fe r to the p o s itio n o f one who is a member o f such a group. This would a t le a s t e xp la in why someone whose p erspe ctive is "e x te rn a l" cannot "g iv e any account o f the manner in which the members o f the group who accept the ru le s view th e ir own re g u la r b ehavior" (p .8 7 ), i . e . , because they count something as good reasons which the person ta k in g the "e x te rn a l" p o in t o f view does n o t. In fa c t, however, H art overstates h is case here. For the e x te rn a l observor can give some account o f what he ob serves; and he can in fa c t e xp la in what he observes by
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What H art leaves us w ith on th is p a r tic u la r p o in t is more a challenge to fu r th e r study than a c a re fu l a n a lysis o f what is in vo lve d . Can we le a rn what s o rts o f judgments and ac tio n s o f o th e r s o rts are im p lie d when someone counts some th in g as a good reason and s p e c if ic a lly when nonconform ity/ co nfo rm ity are counted as good reasons? What is in volved when a person accepts a c e rta in p a tte rn o f behavior as a s o c ia l rule ? I s h a ll not attem pt to answer these questions in th is paper; fo r there is a second ''s a lie n t d iffe re n c e " between actio ns performed under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behavior which I wish to examine. But in b rin g ing these questions to li g h t H art has la id open fo r us an im portant f i e l d fo r fu r th e r study.
There are weaknesses, as I have in d ic a te d , in H a rt's a r gument fo r a d is tin c tio n between actio ns performed tinder a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behavior. H art does n ot r e a lly provide us w ith three s a lie n t d iffe re n c e s between them, as he claim s, but o nly w ith one. (The f i r s t is mere ly a necessary c o n d itio n ; the t h ir d , though im p o rta n t, is o nly an e la b o ra tio n o f the second.) In a d d itio n h is focus on c r it ic is m and pressure, though perhaps understandable in a study s p e c if ic a lly concerned w ith le g a l r u le s , is too narrow fo r an a n a lysis o f s o c ia l ru le s g e n e ra lly . We also need to take account o f the p o s itiv e judgments, i . e , , com mendation, which also attend a ctions performed under s o c ia l r u le s . N evertheless, w ith h is second d iffe re n c e H art has accomplished something o f g re at importance. For he has de m onstrated th a t there is a s ig n ific a n t d iffe re n c e between actio ns performed under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f b e h a v io r.°n o tin g th a t the judgments and o th e r a ctions im p lie d in counting n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity as good reasons are a c tu a lly to be found in those who are members o f the group. The p o in t H art is tr y in g to make is ra th e r th a t the e x te rn a l observor cannot give the same or same s o rt o f account as those who accept the r u le . This is what he must mean when he says th a t one who is not a member o f the group th a t accepts a c e rta in s o c ia l ru le can only record "th e e x te rn a l aspect which ( th e ir behavior) shares w ith a s o c ia l h a b it" (p .5 5 ).
note on term inology seems in o rd er. From one p o in t o f view i t m ight be more a pp ro p ria te to speak o f "a system o f s o c ia l ru le s " ra th e r than o f "a s o c ia l r u le . " For almost every s o c ia l ru le must deal w ith a range o f circumstances and must o fte n deal w ith d iffe r e n t sets o f circumstances w ith in th a t range in d iffe r e n t ways. I t may, fo r example,
E-4 Section Two: A Second Feature o f S o cia l Rules
The c e n tra l p ro p o s itio n o f H a rt's argument, which I have ju s t examined, is th a t where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , noncon fo rm ity / co nfo rm ity to the p a tte rn set down in the ru le cotint in and o f themselves, i . e . , as good reasons, as s u f f ic ie n t ju s t if ic a t io n , fo r criticism /com m endation o f the a ctio ns concerned. This p ro p o s itio n I s h a ll r e fe r to henceforth as the Basic Thesis about a ctions performed under a s o c ia l r u le . In th is se ctio n I s h a ll examine a second fe a tu re o f a ctio n s performed tinder a s o c ia l ru le and propose an a d d i tio n a l th e s is about them. be p a rt o f the s o c ia l ru le th a t the male head is to be bared on e n te rin g a church; th a t, i f there are serious m edical reasons, the head should not be uncovered. I t would seem a t le a s t as a p p ro p ria te to speak o f th is s i t u a tio n as in v o lv in g a system o f s o c ia l ru le s as to speak o f i t as in v o lv in g sim ply a s o c ia l r u le . John Rawls has handled th is problem o f term inology in "Two Concepts o f Rules" by means o f the term " p r a c tic e ," which is taken to r e fe r to a c lo s e ly in te rr e la te d set o f r u le s , to ge th er w ith a p a tte rn o f behavior in co nfo rm ity w ith them. In th is paper, however, I s h a ll continue to fo llo w H a rt's usage o f th e --a d m itte d ly somewhat oversim ple--e xp re ssio n, "a s o c ia l r u le . "
Approaching the term inology problem from another angle, i t is im portant to note th a t H art uses the expression, " s o c ia l r u le , " to r e fe r g e n e ra lly to a l l s o rts o f s o c ia l norms. This has led to a serious m isreading o f H a rt's theory o f law in Ronald D w orkin 's w e ll known c r itiq u e o f H a rt, "The Model o f R u le s," U n iv e rs ity o f Chicago Law Review, XXXV (1967) , re p rin te d as " Is Law a System o f Rules" in R, Summers, Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford U n iv e rs ity Press, 1968T! Proposing a much narrower no tio n o f ru le than H art employs, Dworkin co n tra sts ru le s w ith s o c ia l norms o f another s o rt, which he c a lls " p r in c ip le s ." He then c r it ic iz e s H art fo r speaking only o f ru le s and n e g le c tin g the ro le o f p rin c ip le s w ith in a le gal system. But D w orkin 's " p r in c ip le s " are c e rta in ly included under H a rt's la rg e r n o tio n o f s o c ia l ru le s . A c r itiq u e o f Dworkin and a u s e fu l look a t several o f the su b d ivisio n s o f the general category which H art c a lls sim ply " s o c ia l ru le s " w i l l be found in Joseph Raz, "Legal P rin c ip le s and the L im its o f Law," The Yale Law Jo u rn a l, LXXXI (1972) , pp. 823-854.
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To re tu rn to a now fa m ilia r example, le t us suppose th a t Jones enters a church w ith h is hat on even though there is a s o c ia l ru le in h is community th a t the male head is to be bared on e n te rin g a church. His f a ilu r e to conform is s u f f i c ie n t reason fo r him to be c r it ic iz e d and fo r him to accept the c r itic is m as ju s t if ie d . This much we have a l ready seen.
But now l e t us suppose th a t Jones explains h is a c tio n to us. He t e l l s us th a t he has kept h is h a t on because he is fe a r fu l o f catching a head cold in the d ra fty b u ild in g . We ask him i f he is weighing th is concern against the fa c t th a t h is a c tio n f a i l s to conform to the ru le and is th e re fo re to be judged n e g a tiv e ly . I f he answers th a t p ro te c tin g h is h e a lth has been h is o nly concern in d e lib e ra tin g about h is a c tio n , then we would be r ig h t in c r i t i c i z i n g h is d e lib e ra tio n s fo r f a ili n g to take account o f good reasons, provided by the s o c ia l r u le , fo r b a rin g h is head. ( I am assuming th a t the f u lle s t statement o f the ru le in th is case would not in clu d e fe a r o f a head cold among the le g itim a te excusing co n d itio n s fo r keeping one's head covered.) The only defense a v a ila b le to Jones would be fo r him to in fo rm us th a t we were mistaken in th in k in g th a t he was one o f those who accept th a t p a r tic u la r s o c ia l r u le . I f he does accept the r u le , then h is f a ilu r e to take account o f the c r itic is m o r commendation o f h is a c tio n which derive from the ru le would be unreasonable. Jones cannot claim , w ith o u t c o n tra d ic tin g h im s e lf, both th a t he accepts the s o c ia l ru le and th a t he looks upon the criticism /com m endation based on i t w ith in d iffe re n c e .
The Basic Thesis about actio ns done under a s o c ia l ru le speaks o f the s u ffic ie n c y o f n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity as reasons fo r criticism /com m endation. The th e s is which I am proposing here, which I s h a ll c a ll the Stronger Thesis, a r gues th a t n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity are necessary, th a t is , must be taken account o f, as good reasons fo r those who accept a s o c ia l r u le . What the Basic Thesis t e l l s us is th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , i t is reasonable to take account o f n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity in judg in g whether actio n s covered by the ru le are commendable or subject to c r itic is m .
(This is in c o n tra s t w ith an instance o f a mere p a tte rn o f behavior where ta k in g account o f simple c o n fo r m ity or nonconform ity to the p a tte rn would be unreasonable.) What the Stronger Thesis argues is th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , i t is not only reasonable to take account o f non c o n fo rm ity /c o n fo rm ity , but i t is unreasonable not to take account o f them in ju dg in g a ctions covered by the r u le . To f a i l to take account o f them is i t s e l f a m atter fo r c r i t i cism. 9
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The Stronger Thesis does not say th a t no o ther bases fo r criticism /com m endation o f a ctio ns covered by the ru le are p o ssib le or th a t i t would be unreasonable to take such o th e r bases o f judgment in to account. The Stronger Thesis claim s o nly th a t i t is unreasonable, th a t i t c o n tra d ic ts what we mean when we say th a t a community has a s o c ia l r u le , to f a i l to take n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity in to account in ju dg in g ac tio n s covered by the ru le commendable or su b je ct to c r i t i cism. Thus according to the Stronger Thesis, Jones is not n e c e s s a rily a c tin g unreasonably i f he takes the r is k o f a head cold in to account in h is d e lib e ra tio n s , provided th a t he also takes account o f the fa c t th a t the ru le re q u ire ŝ At several p o in ts in The Concept o f Law H art argues in ways which look forw ard to the Stronger Thesis developed here. But he h im s e lf nowhere suggests a d is tin c tio n between the p o in t made in the Basic Thesis and the p o in t made in the Stronger Thesis. Even in h is treatm ent o f the " t h ir d d i f fe re n c e ," where H art speaks o f those accepting the ru le "having view s" about the importance o f nonconform ity/con fo rm ity to the p a tte rn set down in the r u le , h is approach accords much more c lo s e ly w ith the claim th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity are s u f f ic ie n t as good reasons than w ith the claim th a t they are"] in an im portant sense, necessary. I t is li k e ly th a t H art would agree w ith the Stronger Thesis ; but he does not propose what i t claims in any e x p lic it manner.
Rawls too says th in g s in "Two Concepts o f Rules" th a t look forw ard to the Stronger Thesis, but lik e H art he does not propose i t in any e x p lic it manner or note i t s d iffe re n c e from the Basic Thesis. But since Rawls defends a th e s is about a ctio ns performed under s o c ia l ru le s which seems to be even stron g er than what I have c a lle d the Stronger The s is , i t seems c e rta in th a t Rawls would accept the Stronger Thesis. For Rawls seems to be arguing th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , there only n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity to the p a t te rn set down in the ru le can fu n c tio n as good reasons fo r criticism /com m endation. That is , i t is unreasonable to take account o f anything e ls e . This seems to be the im port o f Rawls' arguments regarding punishment and promises in "Two Concepts o f R u le s," and there are several e x p lic it statements to th is e ffe c t. For example, towards the end o f the a r t ic le Rawls says, "The p o in t I have been making. . . is sim ply th a t where a form o f a c tio n is s p e c ifie d by a p ra c tic e there is no j u s t if ic a t io n p o ssib le o f a p a r tic u la r ac tio n o f a p a r tic u la r person save by reference to the p ra c t i c e . " (p.32) But whatever a d d itio n a l theses Rawls m ight be defending, i t is c le a r from th is statement th a t he would support the Stronger Thesis which I am proposing.
hats to be d o ffe d . But i f in h is d e lib e ra tio n s about how to a ct or in h is ju s t if ic a t io n s o f h is a c tio n to others he should take no account o f what the ru le re q u ire s , i . e . , i f he fa ile d to count n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity as good reasons fo r criticism /com m endation o f h is a c tio n , then he would be a c tin g unreasonably.
I t fo llo w s from th is th a t a person could d e lib e ra te ly f a i l to conform to the p a tte rn set down in a s o c ia l ru le which he and h is community accept w h ile s t i l l a c tin g reason ably and c o n s is te n tly according to the Stronger Thesis. For i t is n o t e s s e n tia l, according to the Stronger Thesis, th a t the person judge th a t n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity have g re a te r w eight than o th e r so rts o f reasons not d e riv in g from the r u le . What is e s s e n tia l is th a t n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity be taken account o f, be counted as s ig n ific a n t c r it e r i a in the process o f ju dg in g the a c tio n commendable or su b je ct to c r itic is m .
(Since the Stronger Thesis im p lie s the Basic Thesis, any a c tio n which is reasonable and co n s is te n t according to the Stronger Thesis would also be reasonable and c o n s is te n t according to the Basic T h e sis.)
This Stronger Thesis not o nly t e l l s us something impor ta n t about actio ns done under a s o c ia l r u le ; i t also p o in ts to a second d iffe re n c e between actio ns done under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behavior. For i t is c le a r th a t we have no conceptual d i f f i c u l t y in speaking o f a s itu a tio n as an instance o f a p a tte ra o f behavior even when the behav io r in question is not u n iv e rs a lly in evidence in the s it u a tio n . Exceptions to the p a tte rn , i . e . , instances o f be h a v io r not in co nfo rm ity w ith the p a tte rn , are p e r fe c tly c o n s is te n t w ith the idea o f a p a tte rn , provided only th a t they are not too numerous.10 But w ith actions done under a s o c ia l r u le , th in g s are d iffe r e n t.
In th is s itu a tio n , there is no room fo r a genuine exception. 1 0 lf the instances o f nonconforming behavior are f a i r l y numerous, o f course, then we are faced w ith the d i f f i c u l t question o f determ ining whether or not the s itu a tio n is p ro p e rly considered an instance o f a p a tte rn o f behavior a t a l l . But, to use the example used e a r lie r , not every member o f the group has to go to the movies on every Saturday n ig h t fo r the group to have a p a tte rn o f behavior o f going to the movies on Saturday n ig h ts . So long as the exceptions, i . e . , the instances o f nonconforming behavior, are not excessive ly numerous, then there is no c o n tra d ic tio n in our speaking o f a s itu a tio n ch aracterize d by exceptions as an instance o f a p a tte rn o f behavior.
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In order to see this, we need to ask first what a genuine exception to a social rule would be.
Since s o c ia l ru le s provide fo r nonconforming a c ts , making them s u b je ct to c r itic is m , i t is c le a r th a t the mere fa c t o f nonconform ity cannot c o n s titu te an a c tio n as a genuine ex ception to the r u le . Moreover, the s itu a tio n s which we com monly speak o f as exceptions to s o c ia l ru le s are not genuine exceptions to the ru le s them selves, but are only exceptions to the sim pler statements o f the ru le s th a t we form ulate to guide ourselves in the cases th a t we encounter the most f r e q u e n tly. F u ll statements o f the s o c ia l ru le s involved would in d ic a te how these s itu a tio n s are to be d e a lt w ith . They are e xce p tio n a l in the sense o f unusual; but they are not genuine exceptions to the ru le s because the ru le s , when f u l l y s ta te d , can be seen to cover them .H For a s itu a tio n to be a genuine exception to a s o c ia l ru le i t would have to f a l l outside what the ru le provides fo r w h ile s t i l l being the s o rt o f s itu a tio n which the ru le covers. For i f the s itu a tio n was not o f the s o rt covered by the r u le , then the ru le would be t o t a lly in d iffe r e n t to i t .
The only k in d o f s itu a tio n which could count as a gen uine exception to a s o c ia l r u le , i t would seem, would be one which was covered by the ru le but which was not to be judged commendable or su bje ct to c r itic is m in the li g h t o f i t , i . e . , on the basis o f i t s co nfo rm ity or nonconform ity to the p a tte rn set down in the r u le . But we have ju s t seen, in the fore g oing arguments fo r the Stronger Thesis, th a t i t is a s e lf-c o n tr a d ic to r y p o s itio n to claim to accept a s o c ia l ru le w h ile ta k in g no account o f n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity to the p a tte rn set down in i t as bases o f criticism /com m enda tio n . Thus, fo r those who accept the r u le , there can be no genuine exceptions, (For those who do not accept the r u le , -A d m itte d ly , o f course, to say th a t a l l one needs in such s itu a tio n s is a " f u l l statement o f the r u le " is to say a l o t . Such " f u l l statem ents" are r a r e ly a v a ila b le . Indeed, the o ld saw about the "exception which proves the r u le " probably re fe rs to the fa c t th a t a s o c ia l ru le r e a lly proves i t s w orth to us when i t enables us to resolve in a f a i r l y c le a r manner not only the o rd in a ry , day-to-day cases, but the e x tra o rd i nary and unusual sets o f circumstances th a t a ris e as w e ll. But regardless o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s in volved in determ ining what would be contained in a f u l l statement o f the r u le , s t i l l fo r every set o f circum stances th a t m ight a ris e , e ith e r the ru le covers those circumstances or i t does not or we d o n 't ye t know what to say (about whether i t covers them or n o t ) . In none o f these cases is there room fo r what we m ight r ig h t l y c a ll a genuine exception to the ru le .
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the ru le y ie ld s nothing in any case.) For those who accept a r u le , e ith e r a p a r tic u la r a c tio n is not covered by the ru le or else i t is e ith e r commendable or su b je ct to c r i t i cism by reason o f i t s co nfo rm ity or nonconform ity w ith what the ru le p re s c rib e s . This is what i t means to say th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , there can be no genuine excep tio n s to the r u le . There is no s ig n ific a n t n o tio n o f ex c e p tio n --o th e r than the exceptions which are sim ply unusual cases not covered in the sim plest statements o f the r u le --where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts .
Here then we have a second im portant p o in t o f d iffe re n c e between actio ns done under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behavior. For i t is a lto g e th e r conceivable th a t a s it u a tio n m ight be an instance o f a p a tte rn o f behavior and at the same time contain genuine exceptions to th a t p a tte rn . But i t is not p o ssib le fo r there to be genuine exceptions among actions performed under a s o c ia l ru le . Every a c tio n which is covered by the s o c ia l ru le must be accounted e ith e r commendable or su bje ct to c r itic is m in terms o f i t s conform i t y or nonconform ity to the p a tte rn set down in the r u le . Any othe r s itu a tio n would be in c o n s is te n t w ith what we mean by a s o c ia l ru le .
Conclusion
My aim in these pages has been to c la r i f y the d is tin c tio n between actio ns performed under a s o c ia l ru le and a mere p a tte rn o f behavior through a c a re fu l study o f two d is t in c tiv e fe a tu re s o f a ctions performed under a s o c ia l r u le . I have expressed these two fe atures in the Basic Thesis and Stronger Thesis. The Basic Thesis, proposed and defended by H.L.A. H art and fu rth e r c la r if ie d here, holds th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , nonconform ity and conform ity to the p a t te rn o f behavior set down in the ru le count in and o f them selves as good reasons fo r c r itic is m and commendation o f actio ns covered by the r u le . That i s , ijt i£ reasonable to take account o f co nfo rm ity and nonconform ity as reasons îô r commendation and c r itic is m . The Stronger Thesis holds th a t, where a s o c ia l ru le e x is ts , nonconform ity and co nfo rm ity to the p a tte rn set down in the ru le must be taken account o f among the reasons fo r c r itic is m and commendation o f a ctio ns covered by the r u le . That is , it^ i£ unreasonable not to take account o f them. This in tu rn means th a t where a soci a l ru le e x is ts there can be no genuine exceptions to the r u le .
There is much work ye t to be done on th is m a tte r, p a r t ic u la r ly in the a na lysis o f what c o n s titu te s acceptance o f a 894 E-IQ s o c ia l r u le , i . e . , H a rt's " in te r n a l a s p e c t," the judgments and a ctio n s o f o the r s o rts th a t are im p lie d in counting n o n co n fo rm ity/co n fo rm ity as good reasons fo r c r it ic is m / commendation. But each step in c la r if y in g the questions i n volved and each e f f o r t to d is tin g u is h one fe a tu re o f our experience from another takes us th a t much c lo s e r to a f u l l and c le a r understanding o f what we mean by a s o c ia l ru le and o f the proper ro le o f such ru le s in our li v e s .
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